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0.1 Set and setting.  
In  this  essay  I  pull  together  several  strings  of  inquiry  with 
reference to Free Software.  Three different  angles characterise 
my approach: firstly, the perspective of anti-capitalist movements 
combined with insights from what  we can loosely call  critical 
political  economy  is  my  anchor,  normatively  as  well  as 
analytically.  The  anti-capitalist  demands  for  a  dissolution  of 
exclusive private property rights in land and its resources, and 
the means of production and distribution are a normative starting 
point. The analysis, in great part jurisprudential, proceeds from 
there. Secondly, I bring in philosophical literature on property, 
which is a desolate province in academic and colloquial thought 
alike,  resulting  in  quite  a  lot  of  ground  work  needing  to  be 
covered. Thirdly, the inter-disciplinary study that I am presenting 
will take as a point of departure - and then depart from - liberal 
analyses of the “networked information economy”.
Free Software is an interesting technological phenomenon, it has 
implications for studies of property, law and social organisation 
(and many other fields) and it constitutes an unusually successful 
narrative for a social movement. In order to define a common 
ground for understanding what anti-capitalist movements are and 
what they need to do, and in order to see how Free Software is  
relevant in that context, I will begin by interacting with Massimo 
De  Angelis's  reading  (2005)  of  John  Holloway's  “Change  the 
World without Taking Power” (2002).
The  key  point  for  De  Angelis  is  the  “problematic  of 
organisation”,  which he sees as absent  in Holloway’s account. 
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This  essay  is  about  the  role  that  property  plays  in  social 
organisation.
Holloway's  starting  point  for  action  is  the  scream:  a  loud 
multitudinous “NO” to the suffering caused by capitalism. Albeit 
not multitudinous originally, rather lonely and lost, it was such a 
NO that  Richard  Stallman,  the  founder  of  the  Free  Software 
Foundation  and  movement,  screamed  when  he  found  himself 
without the commons that had defined the early era of hacking 
(see Section 3.3).  Privatisation entailed the enclosure  of  code, 
which came hand in hand with those aspiring to fame and fortune 
taking  the  money  and  running  to  business  upstarts.  That  left 
Stallman with almost only the ideal of the values of sharing and 
cooperating, but no one to share those values with and very little 
code to cooperate on. Stallman then asked himself one question: 
how do I revive the collapsed hacker commons? This historical 
unfolding precisely supports De Angelis's critique of Holloway, 
which turns on the fact that screaming NO out of helplessness 
really signifies a clash of values.  For Holloway the scream is a 
beginning, a negative starting point that has quite some appeal – 
who is not angry with capital and authoritarian powers? - and the 
scream is for me somewhat reminiscent of Frantz Fanon's anti-
colonial anger. The colonial subject for Fanon is in a mental and 
physical cage, angry and uprooted. To recreate herself - to find 
and realise her own values – she must violently break free of the 
violence of oppression.
To  be  without  the  freedom to  express  and  to  live  and  share  
values, of course, does not mean that one has no values. Rather it  
means that those values are not given space for their realisation. 
The  practice  of  values  has  been  denied.  In  other  words,  the 
premise for the negation of the freedom to practice your shared 
values is that you have such values in the first place. Values are 
expressed – in terms of social relations – in practices that arise 
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from  “needs,  desires,  aspirations,  affects  and  relations”  (De 
Angelis 2005a: 237). The scream and violence as an impetus are 
often the last resort and for Fanon the violence is necessary for a 
liberation  of  the  psyche  of  the  oppressed  (Roberts  2004). 
Through  violence  against  the  coloniser  of  land  and  mind  the 
post-colonial  subject  finds  itself.  Yet,  there  seems  to  be 
something missing from a political  programme that  takes as a 
starting point total despair and helplessness, whether it be a non-
violent  or  a  violent  starting  point.  What  is  missing  is  the 
realisation that helplessness and despair are results of a denial by 
capital of the practice of values. It should perhaps be noted for  
good  measure  that  one  could  imagine  situations  and 
circumstances of life that are so desperate and helpless and have 
been deprived of  space and freedom to practice  values  for  so 
long, that those values have been forgotten. Nevertheless, as De 
Angelis explains:
“The  scream  might  well  be  an  expression  of 
negativity,  but  this  scream  of  refusal,  this  “NO” 
underlines the frustration of a multitude of “yeses”. 
Understood positively this clashing is a clash among 
value practices” (De Angelis 2005a: 237.)
Instead of a multitude of NOs emerging from despair,  we can 
hear the scream as a multitude of yeses or a cry of a culture or a 
community.  That  mediately  leads  us  to  the  questions:  what 
culture or community? And what are (were) their values? It is 
from asking such questions that “the challenges, the alternatives, 
the  contradictions,  the  horizons”  (ibid:  235)  to  and  of  the 
screaming can be approximated. In the multitudinous screaming, 
as a starting point,  the question concerning  how that multitude 
came to scream in concert in the first place is absent. We do not 
know how the “we” that Holloway wants us to start from came 
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about and that for De Angelis is “the absence of the problematic 
of organisation” (ibid.).
The  problematic  of  organisation  concerns  “the  how”.  We  are 
screaming, because our “needs, desires, aspirations, affects and 
relations” are unmet, have been denied us . These are practices 
through which we exhibit our shared, common values and, hence, 
“starting from the multitude of yeses, [Holloway] could not have 
avoided posing the question of their  alternative articulation as 
the central problematic of revolution” (ibid: 237). In the absence 
of  capitalism,  conversely,  how  would  we  organise  our 
community and constitute a space and freedom for living out – to 
the  best  of  our  abilities  -   all  our  needs,  desires,  aspirations, 
affects and relations?
In the ensuing discussion De Angelis juxtaposes power-over with 
power-to, where the “seizing of power is the seizing of  power-
over,  of  the  structure  of  the  hierarchies  and  powers  over  the 
social body”, while the “struggle to liberate power-to is not the 
struggle to confront a counter-power, but rather anti-power”; and 
thus  the  objective  of  the  anti-capitalist  revolution  is  the 
abolishment of power-over through a process of “living relations 
of anti-power” (ibid: 238). If the scream is a cry for help in a 
world where people have become objectified and the nature of 
commodities  is  what  rules  society,  then the  power-to question 
concerns in part how to be able to see ourselves not as objects, 
submitted to the power of objects,  but as a multitude of yeses 
with shared values. De Angelis asks, “since commodity fetishism 
is no illusion,  but  relations between people really  do take the 
form of  relations  between things,  how do we break  with  it?” 
(ibid.); and answers:
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“To  break  the  spell  of  commodity  fetishism, 
relations  between  things  need  not  only  to  to  be 
recognised  as  relations  between  people,  but  acted 
upon.  To de-fetishise is  to recognise that  the only 
constituent social force of those many yeses is your 
articulation with  the  other,  a  relational  dance that 
produces life” (ibid.).
Space and freedom to practice your shared values are certainly 
necessary, but in turn also presupposes a process of establishing 
those values: how did the screaming yeses that are deprived of 
the practice of their shared values get to share those values in the 
first place? Where, how and when did they create those values? 
For David Graeber that is the core of the political. Referring to 
the anthropologist Turner (1978) he notes that:
“The ultimate stakes of politics … is not even the 
struggle  to  appropriate  value,  it  is  the  struggle  to 
establish  what  value  is.  Similarly,  the  ultimate 
freedom is not the freedom to create or accumulate 
value,  but  the  freedom  to  decide  (collectively  or 
individually) what it is that makes life worth living. 
In the end then, politics is about the meaning of life” 
(2001: 88).
Graeber is looking for an understanding of value that begins with 
flow, process and action, rather than a fixed substance of objects. 
Social action is understood to be closer to the meaning of life, so 
to speak, then the mere things with which humans are surrounded 
(and which in capitalism are excessively foregrounded).
In order to make his point, Graeber tells a story of the Baining 
(2001:  69-71),  which  is  a  society  in  Papua  New Guinea  that 
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“appear  as  close  as  one  is  likely  to  find  a  genuinely  simple 
society” (ibid: 69). A people with next to no social structures and 
no  political  structures  at  all.  The  main  observable  action  that 
glues together their society is the sharing of things. Neighbours 
exchange food in same-for-same transactions all the time and the 
most  prestigious  act  is  “being  a  good  provider  to  children, 
thereby turning them into social beings” (ibid: 70-71). For the 
Baining “sweat” is the most quintessential human activity, which 
is “conceived largely in terms of the generation of heat: fire or 
“sweat” in gardening, which in turn is seen as the quintessential  
form of work” (ibid: 70).
The  basic  “value  template”  (Munn  1986),  then,  is  the 
“application of human labour to transform nature into culture” 
(ibid.), but the ultimate aim is not to create “the thing”, but to be 
able to give it away. To be able to feed your children, re-creating 
social beings, and to share with your neighbour and in that way 
to reproduce society is the point of gardening for the Baining. It 
is not literally the fruits of your labour that are the crux of the  
matter  for  the  Baining,  but  rather  the  actions  of  sharing  to  
continually reproduce society that the fruits of your labour make 
possible.  While  it  might  sound  like  the  Baining  are  also 
somehow condemned to  labour  on  things  all  the  time  for  the 
reproduction  of  society,  their  motivations  are  paradigmatically 
different. The value that they see in their work is the action of 
socialisation,  rather  than  the  production  of  things  as  such.  In 
other  words,  at  heart  the  Baining  society  is  a  society  for  the 
production of people and relationships, not things.
Hence,  the  Baining  do  not  need  to  de-fetishise their  society, 
because their relational dance is not subordinated to a commodity 
form. However, their relational dance is certainly involving the 
use and circulation of things in a very important way.
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In  this  essay  I  am  arguing  that  our  ability  to  articulate  our 
“relational  dance” is  greatly facilitated by a basic and general  
understanding of property, as well as an analytical grasp of its 
particular  specifications  and  variations.  I  see  a  better 
understanding  of  property  as  a  necessary  element  in  breaking 
with the commodity fetishism that defines the “thing-like nature 
of social relations in capitalism” (De Angelis 2005a: 239). The 
tune to which we perform our relational dance is written in the 
language of property, as I will show.
Time  is certainly “ripe for  posing the question of  how … we 
relate to each other on this planet (ibid: 242) and “strategic self-
reflection  on  “our  powers  to”  is  a  moment  of  our  own 
empowerment”  (ibid:  244)  and we  must  “recognise  that  [our] 
organising  is  always  affirmative,  positive,  constituent, 
relational”,  because  the  “the  axis  of  revolutionary  thought  is 
another world, other modes of doing, other ways to relate to each 
other, other ways of organising our reproduction as species on 
this planet” (ibid: 245). 
However, this power-to based revolution is not a projection into 
the future, not an imagined community after the revolution, “not 
a model  to conform to,  but  … a social  force emerging in the 
present” (ibid.). On that basis De Angelis takes note of how the 
revolutionary relation between means and ends is  a “powerful 
loop”:
“The  end:  other  ways  of  organising  our  webs  of 
relations.  The  means:  our  organising  webs  of 
relations in the here and now” (ibid.)
In the work of De Angelis and Graeber in the context of value 
and  the  political  question  of  the  meaning  of  life,  we  have 
identified action and the making of people and relationships as a 
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substitution  for  the  commodity.  In  their  forceful  arguments 
concerning relating subjects and associated questions concerning 
their  relational  modalities  they  have  reinstated  the  basic 
organisational  question:  what  kind  of  society  do  we  want? 
Rejecting  the  commodity  form  (as  not the  meaning  of  life) 
rightly foregrounds social relations. Active relationships replace 
the all-encompassing power of the commodity and the associated 
technological  advances that  keep us spell-bound  and bound to 
the nature of things, rather than bound to the nature of the social. 
This  is  an  important  step:  philosophically  engaged,  politically 
significant.
In our next step, then, we take careful note of the fact that  the  
thing of course is not always a commodity. The Baining might be 
the most simple society known, revolving around the making of 
people  and  relationships,  and  capitalism  might  be  the  most 
advanced society known, revolving around the commodity form, 
but what they share in common is that the flow of things – and 
the relations that the flow of things make possible or hinder – is 
the most fundamental movement in their respective societies. In 
other  words,  we can follow Graeber to the Baining and leave 
behind  the  commodity  form  as  the  core  of  our  social 
organisation, but we cannot leave the thing behind, once we have 
realised  how  important  the  sharing  of  things  really  is  in  the 
reproduction of society. That is probably why the magic spell of 
capitalism is so strong: it domesticates the flow of things, which 
(otherwise) brings meaning to our lives.
In other words, we cannot simply background the thing, and that 
is where property comes into the picture. Property brings “the 
thing” back in to our discussion about the meaning of life and its 
political realities.  We acquire a capacity to articulate relational 
modalities when we acquire the language of property and “it is in 
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the  relational  doing  of  organising  that  ...  oppressions  are 
overcome” (De Angelis 2005a: 246)
Things are objects that surround us. Commodities are also things 
that surround us, but they are things that are configured within – 
i.e.  loaded with –  a  very  particular  mode  of  production1.  The 
commodity form through its circulation perpetuates the values of 
capitalism  –  mainly  self-interest  –  but  the  removal  of  “the 
commodity” from our social relations can never amount to the 
removal of “the thing”. Human beings are tool users, sculptors, 
collectors and collaborators and many of our social and creative 
relations unfold with reference to, through the use of, and result 
in things.
An “anti-capitalist commons” will be full of things, but they will 
not  be  commodities  into  which  the  anti-social  value  of  self-
interest is encoded. Anti-capitalist things are objects of cultural 
and creative significance: objects of connection that manifest our 
shared  values  and  our  capacity  to  cooperate  to  realise those 
values. Things emerge in the expression of values to the external 
world.
1 We may here speculate briefly on the relation between a thing and how it is 
organised.  Perhaps  it  could  be  argued  that  the  values  inherent  in  or 
expressed through property protocols “follow” or “attach to” the respective 
thing;  meaning  that  the  social  values  in  questions  are  thus,  potentially, 
perpetuated through the circulation of the thing. Hence, if we accept that 
speculative  proposition,  sharing  perpetuates  sharing;  self-interest  
perpetuates self-interest. This allows us to also see property on a different 
level, since we can say that property is protocols - into which social values  
are  encoded -  for  the  purpose  of  organising  the  care,  production, 
distribution/circulation of goods and resources; and the values with which 
they are organised circulate with those goods and resources. This – with 
regard to Free Software - will become evident in Section 3.5.
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In this expression of values through things we can recognise our 
own imagination – see our selves – and thus in part constitute our 
individual  identity,  but  also  relate  to  others.  Things  are  inter-
subjective and closely associated with the formation of identity. 
Importantly, the  power-to that we imagine here and now, rather 
than project  to  after the revolution,  can manifest  in things.  In 
remembrance of our ancestors and for our children to see, many 
of our value practices are embodied in objects, which circulate 
among us as a testimony to the fact  that value practices are a 
process through which things flow and through which values are 
refined, rewritten, discarded or reaffirmed.
However,  although not  all  things are commodities,  it  does not 
mean that a thing which is not a commodity cannot be the carrier 
of repressive (or any other kind of) values. We can remove the 
thing from the realm of commodities, but we cannot remove the 
potential  power  of  the  thing to  embody and perpetuate  power 
relations. Fundamental social change, therefore, necessarily (but 
not sufficiently) involves foregrounding the role of things and the 
signficance  they  play  in  our  social  realities  and,  in  short,  our 
lifeworlds.
In other words, the process of revolution – of stepping into our 
power-to,  right  here  and  now  –  is  not  simply  a  matter  of 
organising  our  social  relations,  but  to  organise  our  social 
relations  with  regards  to  things.  In  turn,  social  relations  with 
regard to things is the minimal definition of property that I adopt 
in  this  essay  (as  will  be  explained  in  detail  in  Chapter  2).  I 
understand property protocols – in their  most  basic form – as 
articulations of social relations with regard to things. The power 
to articulate your own property relations is the power to write 
one of the most  fundamental  narratives of your community or 
society. Property is not equal to the technical code that organises 
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the flow of commodities.  That  is a very particular  instance of 
property. 
Understanding the screaming yeses in terms of property allows 
us to account for the things that surround us – in and through 
which  we  relate  -   in  articulations  of  our  needs,  desires, 
aspirations,  affects  and  relations.  While  our  needs,  desires, 
aspirations,  affects  and  relations  could  be  inscribed  upon  the 
world in many other ways (not using the framework of property) 
it is for its recursive impact that such an exercise of constituting 
commons in terms of property is especially valuable. 
The commons might not need property directly as a means of 
organisation,  other  terms  and  frameworks  could  possibly  be 
imagined,  but  the  commons need to  inscribe themselves  upon 
property,  understood  as  a  body  of  thought.  The  province  of 
property is desolate, but it is the language of the technical code 
which rules most of the tangible realm, particularly with regard 
to  land  and  its  resources,  and  the  means  of  production  and 
distribution. In order to decode the current ownership of land and 
resources  –  and  as  such  give  new  shape  to  the  material 
foundations from which our needs,  desires,  aspirations,  affects 
and relations arise or are met – we need to speak the language of 
property. 
Moreover, in order to reconfigure these instances of property we 
need  the  language  of  the  commons,  of  the  screaming  yeses, 
because it is in their affirmative actions and value practices that 
helpful new contours of property relations – i.e. social relations 
with regard to things - can be found.
The  question  of  how –  the  question  of  how to  step  into  our 
powers-to –  then becomes not  simply a  question of  relational 
modalities  between  people,  but  a  question  of  the  relational 
19
thecommoner :: issue 14 :: winter 2010
modalities between people with regards to things, or, as it were, 
property.
With that insight consider De Angelis's conclusion that there “is 
no defetishising without context and scale, there is  no context 
and scale without affirmation, discourse, and engagement in the 
organising terrain of the “how”. There is no revolution, not even 
the one in which power is  not  taken but  is  exercised,  without 
strategy  thinking”  (ibid:  249).  The  next  step,  then,  becomes 
obvious: there is no strategic thinking without a careful analysis 
of property.
The  purpose  of  my  essay  is  in  part  to  present  a  version  of 
property  that  can  be  useful  in  critiques  of  existing  property 
rights,  for  self-organisation  of  social  movements,  for 
commoning, and for public policy analysis and advocacy.
As  we  shall  see,  this  is  an  urgent  task,  because  there  is  a  
widespread  tendency  to  conflate  property  in  general with 
property  in  particular.  This  conflation  is  significant  of  an 
“impoverished  concept  of  property  that  has  dominated  our 
political discourse in the twentieth century” (Mossof 2005: 38). 
Current  debate  in  the  context  of  indigenous peoples'  struggles 
reflects  the  same  problem,  revealing  the  need  to  reinvigorate 
informed and informative debate on property. It has been argued 
“In Defense of Property” that there is an:
“...emerging  view,  in  scholarship  and  popular 
society, that it is normatively undesirable to employ 
property law as  a  means of  protecting indigenous 
cultural  heritage.  Recent  critiques  suggest  that 
propertizing culture impedes the free flow of ideas, 
speech, and perhaps culture itself. In our view, these 
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critiques  arise  largely  because  commentators 
associate  “property”  with  a  narrow  model  of 
individual  ownership  that  reflects  neither  the 
substance of indigenous cultural property claims nor 
major theoretical developments in the broader field 
of property law” (Carpenter, Katyal and Riley 2009: 
100).
We  can  here  simply  substitute  Free  Software  for  “indigenous 
cultural heritage” and we have – in great part – the raison d'être 
of  the  present  essay:  rethinking  property  is  highly  overdue, 
especially for anti-capitalists. 
The starting point for the essay is the problematic of organisation 
and the role that property, as a concept and a relationship, plays 
in  that  context.  The  purpose  of  the  essay  is  to  bring  these 
together  in  an  anti-capitalist  vision  of  commoning  through  a 
critical discussion of attempts to resist enclosure in cyberspace. 
The  line  of  argument  presented  in  this  essay  is  in  great  part 
inspired by my work with indigenous peoples and campesinos in 
Ecuador and Peru2:  successful  protection of the Free Software 
commons,  similarly  to  successful  protection  of  traditional 
medicinal knowledge, requires access to and use of the material 
foundations that make either of these types of cultural practices 
possible. There are thus clear conceptual parallels between the 
two: both are struggles for autonomy and over the configuration 
of property relations.
2 Between  2006  and  2008  I  travelled  extensively  in  Ecuador  and  Peru 
undertaking field research, working with social movements, communities 
and  indigenous  peoples'  NGOs  and  organisations  to  better  understand 
property relations other than private property rights, which is a surprisingly 
under-theorised area in jurisprudence.
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In the remaining part of this introduction, I will first present a 
map of the essay. Then I offer some notes on contemporary anti-
capitalist movements, and provide a short narrative of the social 
history  of  enclosures  of  commons,  which  reveals  perennial 
patterns of resistance to privatisation. The purpose is to locate the 
collective  right  of  commoning  –  collective  action  based  on 
shared values, particularly the principles of cooperation and self-
organisation – as a counter-point to the kind of individual, private 
property rights that characterise capitalist  democracy. This will 
help to orientate the discussion of the chapters that are to follow.
0.2 Map of the essay.  
Chapter 1 –  Free Culture in context - is a critical discussion of 
the way in which a number of key commentators are framing the 
politics of cyberspace. I argue that their framing of the debate is 
mistaken in two key ways. First, it conflates private property (a 
particular configuration of property) with the concept of property 
in general. Second, it relies on an untenable distinction between 
the tangible and intangible realm, which I examine in detail with 
reference to the commons of the land.
Section  1.2  –  Beyond  property:  promises  of  the  networked  
information  society -  introduces  cyberspace  in  terms  of 
libertarian  values,  the  techno-social  promise  of  a  “single 
consciousness” in a “global village”, and the architecture of the 
Internet. It then discusses a liberal, economistic conceptualisation 
of  the  novel  co-creative  social  relations  that  cyberspace 
facilitates.  The  libertarian  voices  in  cyberspace  reject  the 
industrial age governments, who have “no sovereignty where we 
gather”,  and state  that  property does  not  apply to  cyberspace, 
because it is a space without matter. A brief technical overview of 
the  Internet  reveals  its  end-to-end  (E2E)  architecture  which 
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facilitates peer-to-peer (P2P) activities and ensures that all data 
flows  equally  through  the  Internet:  the  network  is  “neutral”, 
because all flows of data are equal before the law of the Internet. 
Network “neutrality” and  E2E + P2P is seen as the foundation 
for  a  new  mode  of  production  of  which  the  very  successful 
example  of  Free  Software  is  most  significant.  In  his 
conceptualisation of Free Software, Benkler (2006) has coined 
the term “commons-based peer production”, which is a specific 
type  of  “peer  production”,  all  of  which  he  groups  under  the 
umbrella term “social production”. In presenting Benkler's work 
I also examine his sources of inspiration in order to locate his 
contribution within economic thought and hence illustrate how 
social  production  is  framed  and  thus,  to  a  significant  extent, 
given shape.
Section  1.3  –  Information  exceptionalism:  protecting  social  
production  and the  Internet  commons? -   begins  with  a  brief 
overview  of  the  politics  of  intellectual  property,  which  has 
become an important part of the global political economy. Next, I 
return to the two-fold claim that cyberspace has no matter and 
that  property  applies  to  matter  only.  It  is  a  shared  claim that 
defines the Free Culture movement, which has been inspired by 
the Free Software movement to protect the freedom to share and 
cooperate in cyberspace. This position with regard to property I 
refer  to  as  “information  exceptionalism”.  While  information 
exceptionalism  sets  out  to  protect  social  production  and  the 
cooperative potential of cyberspace, I argue that the insistence on 
a  distinction between the “tangible realm” and the “intangible 
realm”  has  important  political  consequences.  I  show  that 
information exceptionalism partly rests  on a  mistaken contrast 
between property and policy, and begin to develop the argument 
that  understanding  Free  Software  in  terms  of  property  is  a 
recursive process through which the concept of property comes 
to be seen in a new light. 
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Section 1.4 –  Material foundations: on cables and machinery,  
food  and  shelter –  examines  the  material  underpinnings  of 
cyberspace to exhibit the effects and scale of material and energy 
use  involved in  information  and communication  technology.  I 
illustrate how exclusive control  and decision making authority 
over material foundations (given through private property rights) 
facilitates an extraction of wealth from activities unfolding in the 
intangible  realm that  is  dependent  on this  materiality.  I  hence 
argue that the intangible realm is threatened by enclosure in the 
first instance not due to the expansion of private property rights 
into the intangible realm, but because of the existence of capital 
interests  –  based  on  private  property  rights  –  in  the  tangible 
realm.  I  thus  conclude that  the threat  of  cyberspace enclosure 
cannot be confronted simply by rejecting property rights in the 
intangible realm,  because  their  existence  in  that  realm  is 
primarily  an  effect.  It  is  also  necessary  to  address  the  actual 
cause of enclosure as it exists in the  tangible realm, and which 
arises  from exclusive control  over  land,  its  resources,  and the 
means of production and distribution. Moreover, by positioning 
themselves in this way, information exceptionalists fail to show 
solidarity  with  the  commons  of  the  land,  that  is,  the  real 
commons. The virtual commons are thus disembodied and left 
vulnerable to the exigencies of the material realm. Consequently, 
they  are  in  perpetual  need  of  a  strong  state  for  regulatory 
intervention in order to continuously limit the reach of capital.
Chapter  2  –  The  properties  of  property –  is  an  analytical 
disentanglement  of  property  in  particular  (as  in  the  form  of 
private  property)  from property  in  general  (as  social  relations 
with regard to things). The purpose is to provide a framework 
within  which  the  social  relations  of  commoning  can  be 
understood alongside other variants of property relations, such as 
private  or  public  property.  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  less 
normative  than  it  is  analytical:  property  is  made  up  of 
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components  that  can  be  configured  in  different  ways. 
Understanding the elementary structure of property facilitates its 
reconfiguration. While providing mainly a structural account of 
property, I nonetheless start from the normative assumption that 
private property can only be justified for real persons and only 
for  a  limited  number  of  things.  The  institution  of  property 
distributes decision-making authority over access to and use of 
resources in societies. Private property invests such authority in 
individuals and quasi-individuals, such as firms, authorising their 
pursuit  of  self-interest.  While  private  property  as  sovereignty 
might  develop  personal  autonomy  and  identity,  enable  open-
ended  creativity,  and  constitute  protection  from  external 
interference,  in  capitalist  democracy,  it  primarily  legitimises 
profiteering in the interest of shareholders. As against the popular 
myth of the “tragedy of the commons”, I hold that care for things 
such  as  land,  its  resources,  and  the  means  of  production  and 
distribution is best achieved collectively.
Section 2.2 - Property in general, property in particular – is an 
introduction  to  the  complexity  and elusiveness  of  the  idea  of 
property.  It  presents  and  relativises  the  idea  of  property  as 
dominion: the absolute control of an individual over a thing of 
the  external  world.  While  this  conception  runs  deep  in  much 
philosophical and everyday discourse, it is argued that no legal 
system has ever instituted property relations that were absolute in 
this sense. Limitations are part of all known property regimes. I 
will introduce the work of James Harris in this section, who has 
forcefully argued that despite the importance of limitations, the 
conception of property as dominion is presupposed in all legal 
systems.
Section 2.3 -  Property  as  social  relations -  is  an explanatory, 
gleaning  journey  through  key  texts  and  concepts  in  liberal 
jurisprudence. I begin this section with an exposition of W. N. 
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Hohfeld's  matrix  of  jural  relations  which correlates  rights  and 
duties  and  powers  and  liabilities.  Using  an  anthropological 
application  of  that  matrix,  and  support  from  within  liberal 
jurisprudence,  I  argue  that  property  is  normative  protocols  
guiding relations between people with regard to things.  Next I 
draw  upon  Harris's  account  of  property  as  a  mechanism  for 
distributing  control  powers  and  use  privileges  with  regard  to 
resources. I adopt Harris's characterisation of private property as 
authorising  self-seekingness  in  one's  use  of  and  control  over 
things. While I agree with his view that all property relations in 
capitalist democracy are developments of the fundamental idea 
of  dominion,  I  argue that  it  is  crucial  to  begin an account  of 
property with the open-ended idea of social relations with regard 
to  things.  To  do  so  is  to  confront  the  hegemony  of  private 
property  in  political  and  legal  theory,  as  a  corollary  of  its 
confrontation in practice.
Section  2.4  -  A framework  for  property  as  social  relations  –  
introduces  three  core  variables  of  property  as  social  relations 
with regard to things. The relating subject refers to the social unit 
within which property relations hold and are performed, usually a 
community; the  related-to object  refers to the thing or resource 
with regard to which property relations hold and are performed; 
and  the  relational  modality  refers  to  the  way  in  which  these 
relations are shaped through normative protocols, by guiding the 
behaviour of people with regard to one another and the use of 
things. I discuss these variables and their possible extensions at 
length,  and  argue  that  property  relations  are  primarily  about 
actions,  and  property  protocols  hence  about  enabling  or 
constraining action. I also make the case that property protocols 
inhere  in  customary  practices  and values  as  much as  in  legal 
codes  and otherwise  articulated  norms.  This  is  important  as  I 
want to be able to account for commons, and traditional relations 
and practices of commoning, as property. I conclude that in order 
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to understand what it means to own something, an inquiry into 
the  relational  modality  of  any  given  form  of  property  is 
indispensable.
Section  2.5  -  Specification  of  property:  the  configurations  of  
relational  modality –  is  an  examination  of the  elementary 
structure of private property. Following Harris, I show that basic 
private property consists of a collocation of  legitimised control 
power  and use privileges.  Control  power  is  legitimised  in  the 
sense  that,  short  of  contravening  criminal  and  other  law, 
whatever decision the owner makes with regard to the use of a 
thing  is  justified,  simply  by  virtue  of  being  her  decision.  I 
provide  heuristic  diagrams  in  order  to  bring  to  the  fore  the 
different elements which make up basic private property on the 
one hand, and capitalist private property on the other. Capitalist 
private  property  is  characterised  by  a  collocation  of  control 
power not only with use privileges, but also with wealth effects, 
or  income rights.  The collocation,  however,  is  by no means a 
necessary one. Moreover, a justification of one of the elements 
(control  power)  does  not  amount  to  a  justification  of  another 
element (wealth effects). I show by way of illustrative examples 
that changing the structure of private property, or  reconfiguring 
its  specifications, even  if  only  in  small  ways,  can  lead  to 
surprising  transformations  of  the  kind  of  community  that  this 
relational modality gives rise to. 
Section  2.6 -  Property  and commons –  discusses  the  ways in 
which  common  property forms  are  usually  classified  and 
distinguished  from  private  property,  and  the  ways  in  which 
commons  can  be  understood  as  particular  kinds  of  property 
configurations. I note that the values underlying private property 
are  in  important  ways  the  common  values  of  capitalist 
democracy. This points towards the view which I further develop 
later in this section, namely that capitalist democracy is, in some 
27
thecommoner :: issue 14 :: winter 2010
not  insignificant  way,  also  a  commons.  A discussion  of  three 
different  accounts  of  common  forms  of  property  (Benkler, 
Waldron,  Harris), shows that  the differences between different 
property  forms  are  all  differences  in  the  configuration  of, 
essentially,  the  same  elements.  The  substitution  of  “social 
interest” for “legitimate self-seekingness” is identified as the key 
characteristic of non-private property forms. I argue that property 
protocols,  whichever  way  they  may be  expressed,  all  provide 
answers to the question of who makes (or can make) decisions 
over the actions of people with regard to things, and by reference 
to what these decisions are legitimised. In order to develop an 
idea of a self-constituted commons within capitalist democracy, I 
use Harris's account of communitarian property, which he sees as 
a form of resource-holding that is recognised by, yet autonomous 
from, the wider legal system that surrounds it. I argue that the 
articulation of property protocols facilitate such self-constitution.
Chapter 3 – Free Software as property – is a detailed exposition 
of the Free Software movement, its history, practices, and legal 
innovations.  I  cast  it  as  a  commons  that  has  autonomously 
constituted itself.  The aim of this chapter is  to show how and 
why it makes sense to understand Free Software as property. Not 
only is the central achievement of the Free Software movement 
the  reconfiguration  of  core  elements  of  copyright,  that  is,  a 
transformation  of  property  relations,  but  conceptualising  the 
relational modalities of Free Software in terms of property also 
feeds  back  into  the  concept  of  property:  mapping  this 
understanding  back  onto  the  tangible  realm reanimates  debate 
about the range of possible property relations more generally.
Section 3.2 –  The nature of code – provides a basic account of 
software  in  terms  of  how  its  code  is  written,  developed, 
commented  upon  and  finally  converted  into  executable 
programmes  that  can  be  run  on  a  computer.  Because  of  the 
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inscrutability of  binary code – readable only by machines – it 
follows that access to the source code – readable by humans – is 
a precondition for analysis, customisation and public scrutiny of 
software.  Without  this  access  to  the  source  code,  software 
represents  a  “black  box”  technology,  the  internal  workings  of 
which are hidden,  and hence uncertain. Given that  software is 
integral to many crucial systems, such as engines, brakes, flight 
control, ambulance dispatch, power stations etc., the creation of 
uncertainty constitutes  not  only a  democratic  issue,  but  a  real 
danger.
Section 3.3 – A brief history of Free Software and its imaginary,  
scientific and cultural origins – begins with an examination of 
how  the  science  of  computing  is  embedded  in  the  scientific 
commons which predates the rise of modern science. I provide a 
detailed account of  the enclosure  of the  hacker commons that 
began in the 1970s, the consequent resistance to this privatisation 
which led to the establishment of the Free Software Foundation 
(FSF) in  1985,  and the political  disagreements  that  led to  the 
formation of the Open Source Initiative (OSI). I argue that at the 
heart of Free Software lies a principled philosophy of freedom 
and  community  building,  discarded  as  “ideology”  by  OSI. 
Stripped of FSF’s political  origins,  Open Source is hence best 
understood as an engineering methodology for a market-based 
economy. 
Section 3.4 – The Free Software movement as a recursive public 
– discusses the main points of a recent study of Free Software 
and its  cultural  significance.  Free Software is  understood as a 
“recursive public” that is “vitally concerned” with the conditions 
of and possibilities for its own coming into being (Kelty 2008). 
While  the  Free  Software  movement  remains  a  paradigmatic 
example of a recursive public, I argue that its recursive nature 
does  not  include  the  crucial  recursive  relation  between  the 
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tangible and the intangible realm, as noted in Chapter 1. The Free 
Software  commons  remains  ideologically  and  practically 
separated  from  the  commons  of  the  land  and  its  material 
resources.
Section  3.5  –  The  GNU  General  Public  License:  copyright  
subversion  and  constitution –  is  an  analysis  of  the  software 
license that articulates the common values around which the Free 
Software community has emerged. The shared desire and need to 
cooperate  on  computer  code  has  been  condensed  into  “four 
freedoms” of Free Software. Using the framework developed in 
Chapter 2, I show how this license, the GPL, is an articulation of 
these  common  values  in  the  form  of  sub-clauses  to  existing 
copyright, which ensures that once a piece of software code has 
been published under  the GPL, it  remains  freely available  for 
anyone  to  use  for  any  purpose  except  enclosure.  This  self-
articulated  relational  modality  hence  ensures  reciprocity  in  
perpetuity and uses copyright subversively to both constitute the 
software commons, and defend it against enclosure. The creation 
and  maintenance  of  a  commons  within  capitalist  democracy 
necessitates an interfacing with its legal, political and economic 
dimensions.  The  example  of  Free  Software  shows  that  the 
articulation of property protocols on part  of  social  movements 
and  communities  can  make  innovative  use  of  trespassory 
protection  provided  by  the  overarching  legal  system  through 
conventional  property  rights,  in  a  way  that  undermines  rather 
than strengthens the logic  of  capitalist  private  property.  I  also 
argue that the GPL acts as a constitution of the Free Software 
community.
Section 3.6 –  Defending the GPL: a recursive  public  defends  
itself – reviews a small number of key legal proceedings which 
establish that the GPL is indeed sanctioned by copyright law. I 
show in this section how a self-defence mechanism has emerged 
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spontaneously  within  the  Free  Software  movement, 
complementing the protection that copyright affords. I maintain 
that the Free Software example provides an embryonic model for 
other  voluntary  associations  to  autonomously  constitute  and 
defend themselves against enclosure. 
Finally, I conclude that solidarity between the real commons of 
the  land  and  the  virtual  commons  of  cyberspace  and  a 
recognition of the interpenetration of the tangible and intangible 
realm, as well as an anti-capitalist vision of politics are necessary 
elements in a defence against the enclosure of cyberspace.
In the rest of the introduction I want to present some notes first 
on  contemporary  anti-capitalism,  before  turning  to  a  social 
history of the perennial resistance to capitalism. 
0.3 Social history: a foundation for a networked information   
society from below?
The history of anti-capitalism is also the history of defending the 
commons  and  in  the  patterns  of  resistance  to  capitalism  the 
relational modes of commoning are often revealed. I first very 
briefly  present  the  notion of  contemporary anti-capitalism and 
then turn to a historical view, showing that resistance is perennial 
and  that  struggles  against  capital  are  interconnected  and 
intergenerational..
Contemporary  anti-capitalism  is  often  called  a  “movement  of 
movements”.  This “movement of movements” has recently been 
mapped ethnographically by Marianne Maeckelberg in “The Will 
of the Many: How the Alterglobalisation Movement is Changing 
the  Face  of  Democracy”  (2009)  following  the  “militant 
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ethnography”  by  Jeffrey  Juris  in  “Networking  Futures:  The 
Movements Against Corporate Globalization” (2008):
“Last week marked the ten-year anniversary of the 
“Battle  of  Seattle”,  when  tens  of  thousands  of 
protesters successfully shut down the World Trade 
Organisation’s  ministerial  meetings  on its  opening 
day. Taking negotiators and the media by surprise, 
the  mass  mobilisation  of  diverse  groups,  from 
environmentalists  to  trade  unionists,  effectively 
stalled trade talks that  many critics suggest  would 
have  consolidated  global  corporate  power  at  the 
expense  of  the  world’s  poor  and  marginalised. 
Hailed  …  as  the  global  justice  movement’s 
‘coming-out  party’,  many  commentators  view  the 
protests as a major inspiration for the transnational 
mobilisations  for  social,  economic  and 
environmental justice that are now a regular feature 
at international policy meetings” (White 2009).
Participating in social movements in England one discovers that 
it is often taken for granted that June 18, 1999 - more than five 
months before Seattle, when the financial district of London was 
“transformed by carnival as the G8 attempt to meet in Cologne, 
Germany” (Dissent 2005) - was a defining moment in the birth of 
the movement. Others will consider the human chain around the 
conference  centre  hosting  the  G8  in  Birmingham  in  1998  a 
beginning  point.  That  is  precisely  why  it  is  a  movement  of  
movements: it is not a singular movement with a leadership or 
central  committee,  but  a  global  network  of  movements  who 
protest and organise against capitalism and “the negative aspects 
of  globalisation”.  Through  my  participation  in  radical  social 
movements  and  in  the  Free  Software  movement,  I  am,  with 
particular reference to property, “teasing out the hidden … logics 
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that underlie certain types of social action; how people's habits 
and  actions  make  sense  in  ways  that  they  are  not  themselves 
completely aware of” (Graeber 2007: 305)3. 
To  illustrate  the  perennial  nature  of  anti-capitalist  social 
movements – it will be instructive to review some perspectives 
from social history about the foundations for, the transition into 
and  through capitalism. The historical  perspective serves three 
specific purposes. Firstly, it reminds us of the inter-generational 
reality of the struggle.  We are fighting with those who fought 
before  us  and for  those who will  fight  after  us.  This  is  not  a 
signal  to  follow  some  dogmas  laid  down  in  the  course  of 
revolutionary history, on the contrary, it  is a measure to avoid 
3 “[O]ne  always  learns  more  about  a  movement  by  studying  it  from the 
inside. "Inside" can mean various things. Actual participation is best, but is 
not possible if one is studying a movement of the past or one from which 
one is excluded, or which one has no sympathy for, etc. ... [I]t is especially 
important for those who study, teach or write about social movements to try 
to  get  inside  their  skins,  so  to  speak.  Otherwise  the  study  of  social  
movements is likely to become one more academic sub-field, of little help  
to the movements themselves, either in terms of the analysis that is made or 
in  terms  of  the  likelihood of  students  in  the  field themselves  becoming 
involved  in  progressive  social  movements”  (Barbara  Epstein  in  DeWitt 
1998). My participation in contemporary social movements against capital – 
in addition to many meetings, parties, protests, organisation, mobilisation 
and getting beatn up, shouted and shot at - has included reflection through 
cameras,  interviews  and  analyses.  Niko  Apel,  Nina  Moeller  and  I,  as 
Tortuga Films, made “genova città aperta” (2002 / 49 mins)  and  “DOGS 
RUN  FREE”  (2004  /  33  mins).  The  former  provides  impressions  and 
expressions of the events that surrounded the Genoa Social Forum and the 
G8 meeting in July, 200, and has been shown widely at film festivals and 
social movement gatherings, as well as featured by an independent cinema 
in Frankfurt am Main, Germany and regional, public television. The latter is 
an analytical glance  at the building of Fortress Europe through migration 
management,  regulation,  and control  and the social  movements  resisting 
these processes.  Used  for  teaching in  various universities  and shown at 
events organised by the No Border movement: www.noborder.org
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just  that.  It  is  always  good  to  know what  battles  have  been 
fought.  Secondly,  it  will  reveal  a  crucial  difference  in  the 
conception of rights.  For the commoners,  as we shall  see,  the 
concept of a right to – which essentially is an articulation of a 
power-to – is not an abstract ideal based exclusively on the legal 
concept  of  an “individual”.  Rather, a right  of commoning is a 
particular  collective  power-to with  regards  to  some  thing  or 
resource.  Thirdly,  the  value  practices  of  anti-capitalist 
movements and their strong focus on access to land, resources 
and the  means of  production and distribution  – if  we  assume 
common  normative  grounds  in  that  respect  –  show  us  by 
implication  that  contemporary  liberal,  economistic 
conceptualisations of Free Software and other forms of social co-
production  in  the  intangible  realm  are  misguided.  When 
economists such as Benkler (2006) posit the idea of agency and 
autonomy as achievable in virtual commons, but without specific 
reference to real commons, they are confining such agency and 
“autonomy” to the state and to capital. Without the body and the 
commons of the land, the virtual commons separated from the 
basic source of all wealth, namely the material realm, becomes a 
“capitalist commons”.
I begin with a brief introduction to the processes of enclosure, 
before turning to the way in which enclosure has been resisted.
Capitalist democracy has historically been justified - as well as 
criticised - through myths of “improvement” (Thompson 1993) 
and instituted by a central, coercive authority: the nation state.
“[We] should remember that the spirit of agricultural 
improvement in the 18th century was impelled less 
by altruistic desires to banish ugly wastes or – as the 
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tedious  phrase  goes  –  to  “feed  a  growing 
population” than by the desire for  fatter  rent-rolls 
and larger profits” (Thompson 1963: 217).
Central  to  capitalist  logic  is  the  myth  -  understood both  as  a 
legend  and  as  a  falsehood  (Christman  1994)  -  that 
“improvement”  of  the  land  and  development  of  goods  and 
resources are only optimal or indeed only realistically possible 
with  the  implementation  of  strong  and  strongly  enforced 
exclusive,  private  property  rights,  given  the  natural, 
predominantly  self-interested,  rational  character  of  the  human 
being.
“The arguments of the enclosure propagandists were 
commonly phrased in terms of higher rental values 
and higher yield per  acre.  In village after  village, 
enclosure destroyed the … subsistence economy of 
the poor – the cow or geese, fuel from the commons, 
gleanings,  and  all  the  rest.  The  cottager  without 
legal proof of rights was rarely compensated. The 
cottager who was able to establish his claim was left 
with a parcel of land inadequate for subsistence and 
a disproportionate share of the very high enclosure 
costs”. (Thompson 1963: 217)
Where the myths have been insufficiently persuasive, capitalist 
democracy  has  been  violently  imposed  (Thompson  1977; 
Linebaugh 2006) and/or the power of persuasion inherent in the 
manifestations of material and technological progress has further 
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helped entrench private, industrial interest and solidify capitalist 
democracy by destroying commons4. 
Enclosure and violence continue in particular in connection with 
extractive industries - timber, oil, gold, silver and other minerals. 
This is  most  visible in tropical  forests  and other resource-rich 
regions hitherto unexploited.  The degradation of eco-systems – 
rivers, oceans, fish stocks, to name but a few major eco-systems 
–  is  severe,  because  “[c]apitalism  as  a  growth  economy  is 
impossible to reconcile with a finite environment’ (Leahy 2008: 
481). As John Urry writes:
“Capitalism is  not  able  to  control  the  exceptional 
powers which it itself generated, especially through 
new  forms  of  excessive  consumption  that   are 
changing climates and eliminating some conditions 
of  human  life  and  its  predictable  improvement” 
(2010: 3).
The  detrimental  social,  economic  and  environmental 
consequences - by now well known - have generated movements 
of resistance that are increasingly globally networked in practices 
and  ideas  (Linebaugh  2008).  Environmental  problems  are  by 
4 As noted above, informational flows have always played a central role in 
the spread of capitalism. Enclosure from within is an example hereof: the 
idea of the advantages to be gained from enclosure is an informational flow 
that reaches the commoner's imagination, who then decides to build a fence. 
Moreover,  working with indigenous peoples  in  the Amazon teaches one 
about the power of the ideas and associated “needs of the city”, which are  
quickly taken on by people moving to the city from the forest. Enclosure 
from within, however, is driven by a very violent politics of privatisation. 
See  Mo  Hume's “The  Politics  of  Violence:  Gender,  Conflict  and 
Community  in  El  Salvador”  (2009)  for  an  insightful case  study  on  the 
violence of developmentalism.
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definition global in nature and the ideas and the concept of “the 
environment” have the capacity to link together different forms 
of resistance in geographically different places, which is why, as 
we  shall  see  in  Chapter  1,  the  “cultural  environmentalism” 
movement invokes the idea of the environment as a connective 
metaphor.
The social  history of  resistance to  capitalism,  whose marginal 
voices  presented  alternatives  to  the  bourgeois  revolution  that 
actually took place, has been well documented since the 1960s. 
Christopher  Hill  has  argued  that  the  radical  voices  of  the 
seventeenth century:
“...speculated  about  the  end  of  the  world  and 
coming of the millennium; about the justice of God 
in  condemning  the  mass  of  mankind  to  eternal 
torment for a sin (if anyone) Adam committed; some 
of them became sceptical of the existence of hell. 
They contemplated the possibility  that  God might 
intend  to  save  everybody,  that  something  of  God 
might be within each of us. They founded new sects 
to  express  these  new ideas.  Some  considered  the 
possibility that there might be no Creator God, only 
nature.  They  attacked  the  monopolization  of 
knowledge  within  the   privileged  professions, 
divinity, law, medicine. They criticized the existing 
educational  structure,  especially  the  universities, 
and  proposed  a  vast  expansion  of  educational 
opportunity.  They  discussed  the  relations  of  the 
sexes, and questioned parts of the protestant ethic. 
The  eloquence,  the  power,  of  the  simple  artisans 
who  took  part  in  these  discussions  is  staggering” 
(1975: 362).
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Those voices – in their  particular  contemporary formats – can 
still be heard in social movements today, reflecting the often used 
motto:  “the  struggle  continues”.  The  struggle  over  ideas  of 
organisation and the flows of information that spread the word 
repeats itself.
The way in which social history literature, as established by Hill, 
E.  P.  Thompson and those who were to  follow,  has  served to 
connect  past  and  current  social  struggles  cannot  be 
underestimated. Silvia Federici has argued convincingly that the 
transition  into  capitalism  involved  and  presupposed  the 
repression  of  women,  including  religious  burning  of  witches, 
men and women, and the confinement of the woman to the house 
of a nuclear family as a basic reproductive unit (2004). Although 
writing from a marxian feminist  perspective,  her  work can be 
read for the purposes of connecting spiritual ideas and practices 
with anarchistic feminism and contemporary social movements. 
Moreover,  Federici  has  also  shown  that  the  “development  of 
capitalism was  not  the  only  possible  response to  the  crisis  of 
feudal  power”  (2004:  61)  and  that  throughout  “Europe,  vast 
communalistic  social  movements  and  rebellions  against 
feudalism had offered the promise of a new egalitarian society 
built on social equality and cooperation”, and she observes that 
by 1525 “their most powerful expression, the “Peasant War” in 
Germany  or  …  the  “revolution  of  the  common  man,”  was 
crushed” (ibid.). E.P. Thompson has systematically revealed the 
contours  of  enclosure  and  thus  the  origins  and  character  of 
capitalist democracy:
“For  example,  in  the  enclosure  of  Barton-on-
Humber,  where  attention  was paid to  common 
rights, we find that out of nearly 6,000 acres, 63% 
(3,733  acres)  was  divided  between  three  people, 
while fifty-one people were awarded between one 
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and three acres: or, broken down another way, ten 
owners  accounted  for  81%  of  the  land  enclosed, 
while the remaining 19% was divided between 116 
people. The average rental value of the arable land 
enclosed rose in five years (1794-9) from 6s. 6d. To 
20s. an acre; and average rentals in the parish were 
more than trebled” (Thompson 1963: 217; emphasis 
added).
That  enclosures  fomented  resistance,  riots  broke  out  and 
uprisings  were  attempted  repeatedly  throughout  the  realm  is 
hardly of surprise. Neither is it very surprising that consequently 
repression  intensified  and  social  life  turned  tumultuous.  “The 
profession of a soldier was held to be dishonourable” (Thompson 
1963:  81),  and  “[r]esistance  to  an  effective  police  force 
[instituted  as  a  preventative  force  of  control  and  surveillance, 
deterrence and threat] continued well into the 19th century (ibid.). 
A very wide range of new “thanatocratic” laws to manage the 
side  effects  of  enclosure  –   vagrancy,  poverty,  despair, 
homelessness, hunger – were enacted. These processes have been 
covered in Peter Linebaugh's “The London Hanged: Crime and 
Civil  Society  in  the  Eighteenth  Century”  (Linebaugh  2006; 
particularly 42-73). In very brief, these draconian laws to keep 
the  poor  in  check  further  show  the  origins  of  capitalist 
democracy:
“The year 1661 saw the promulgation of the  first 
slave code in English history, enacting that human 
beings become “real chattels” ...  Also in 1661 the 
thirty-six  Articles  of  War  were  promulgated  … 
twenty-two of which provide the death penalty … 
Besides  that  thanatocratic  code,  discipline  in  the 
navy  was  maintained  by  “customs  of  the  sea” 
[including]: the spread eagle, ducking, mastheading, 
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keelhauling, marrying the gunner's daughter, and the 
cat-of-nine-tails. In addition to the slave codes, the 
military codes and the Irish penal code, the criminal 
code  with  its  “new”  capital  offences  formed  the 
characteristics of this era of substantive British law” 
(Linebaugh 2006: 53).
This is  the background setting:  capitalist  democracy is  violent 
and expansive. I now look at some of the ways in which it has 
been creatively resisted.
Driven  from  the  destroyed  commons  as  a  consequence  of 
enclosure, or leaving the commons before they were destroyed in 
search for urban promises,  many drifted and due to legal  and 
economic pressures went into ships and into factories. On board 
the  ships,  many  of  the  wretched  sailors  began  to  establish  a 
global solidarity and became pirates to fight for their cause. They 
began to recreate commons.
The  history  of  anti-capitalist  piracy  unfolded  mainly  between 
1650 and 1730 and culminated in “The Golden Age of Piracy” 
(1716-1726),  during  which  an  estimated  2.400  vessels  were 
plundered  and  captured  by  pirate  ships  with  a  multinational 
motley crew - or  “multiracial  maroon community” (Linebaugh 
2008: 107) - creating “a crisis in the lucrative Atlantic system of 
trade” (Rediker 2004: 9; see also Linebaugh and Rediker 2000). 
Pirates,  slaves,  and  revolting  labourers  established  egalitarian 
alternatives to abysmal conditions of the working classes upon 
whose labour the modern world was founded and they, we may 
say,  hacked  the  transatlantic  network  of  capitalist  expansion, 
recreating  commons  or  establishing  practices  of  commoning 
(explained below): 
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“Pyrates and Buccaneers, are Princes to [Seamen], 
for there, as none are exempt from the General Toil 
and Danger; so if the Chief have a Supream Share 
beyond his Comrades, 'tis because he's always the 
Leading Man in e'ry daring Enterprize; and yet as 
bold as he is in all other attempts, he dares not offer 
to infringe the common laws of Equity; but every 
Associate  has  his  due Quota  ...  thus  these Hostes 
Humani Generis as great robbers as they are to all 
besides,  are  precisely  just  among  themselves; 
without  which they could no more Subsist  than a 
Structure  without  a  Foundation.”  (Barnaby  Slush, 
1709, in Rediker 2004: 60).
It  has been shown specifically how slaves began to develop a 
notion of global solidarity in the bottom of the ships that were the 
essential  engines  of  growth  “in  the  rapidly  growing  Atlantic 
system of capital and labor” and that these ships “linked workers 
free,  and unfree,  and everywhere in between,  in capitalist  and 
non-capitalist  societies  on  several  continents”  (Rediker  2009: 
348).
The  notion  of  global  solidarity,  or  an  anarchistic  union  of 
peasant,  poor  and working classes,  has  also been explored by 
Benedict  Anderson  (2005).  He  traces  the  origins  of  global 
solidarity  –  and  the  imaginary  of  the  current  global  social 
movement of movements for globalisation from below - through 
anti-colonial  fiction  and  non-fiction  literature  and 
correspondence between key figures in particularly the struggle 
for independence in the Philippines in the 19th Century. Anderson 
shows how this anti-colonial imagination not insignificantly was 
shaped  by  experiences  in  the  “mother  countries”  and  the 
association  with  the  “transnational  libraries”  or  “la  république 
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mondiale des lettres” (ibid: 28)5.  The anti-colonial imagination 
emerged by weaving contemporary narratives from avant-garde 
literature  with  sensibilities,  tactics  and  strategies  formed  by 
anarchist movements into a revolutionary consciousness with a 
global  perspective.  A melting  pot  in  the  undergrowth  of  the 
global  village.  The  global  dimension  to  this  emerging 
revolutionary  global  force  from  below  -  thrown  together  in 
factories, ships and colonies - took obvious inspiration from the 
realisation that the majority of all people around the world were 
subjected to the power of the few in very similar ways: it was 
realised  that  this  was  not  just  a  question  of  race.  Indeed,  the 
suffering  of  the  peasants  and  working  classes  in  the  mother 
countries were in many cases even worse than that suffered by 
the colonial  subjects,  thus  giving shape to  global  networks of 
resistance from below:
“My dear fellow, I have myself gone to see an iron 
foundry, I spent five hours there, and believe me, no 
matter  how  hardhearted  a  person  may  be,  the 
spectacle  that  I  witnessed  there  made  the  deepest 
impression  upon me.  Despite  all  the  evil  that  the 
friars  commit  over  there,  our  compatriots  are 
fortunate compared to this misery and death. There 
was a workshop there for grinding up sand and coal, 
which, converted into the finest dust by the action of 
the  milling  machine,  swirled  up  in  huge  black 
clouds,  and  the  whole  room  seemed  swathed  in 
smoke.  Everything there was filled with dust,  and 
5 Whether  pamphleteering  or  blogging,  the  arrival  of  new  information 
technologies is almost always marvelled at by political commentators, or 
decried as a terrible fall from values.
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the ten or twelve workers busy shovelling the coal 
and sand into the machine looked just like corpses” 
(Josè Rizal, 1891, in Anderson 2005: 106).
Having  taken  note  of  the  perennial  and  global  nature  of 
resistance to privatisation I now explore the difference between 
rights of commoning and the private property rights that replaced 
them and continue to replace them worldwide.  This difference 
will have implications for our efforts to understand commoning 
as property in Chapter 2.
In  the  latest  addition  to  the  social  history  library,  Linebaugh 
makes his best effort yet to connect movements of old and today 
around  the  concept  of  the  commons  in  “The  Magna  Carta 
Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All” (2008). Linebaugh 
sets  on  par,  rightly  so,  the  mainly  peasant  and  indigenous 
experiences of contemporary enclosure with the experiences of 
those whose  lands –  whose commons  – were  enclosed  in  the 
transition  into  capitalism,  especially  from  the  13th century 
onward.  He  lists  the  leader  of  the  indigenous  peasants  of 
Chiapas,  Subcomandante Marcos,  the Nigerian women who in 
outrage in 2003 occupied a Chevron oil terminal, women of the 
upland  communities  of  Vietnam,  whose  forest  reserves  are 
enclosed with consequent suffering, the Native Americans of the 
Adirondacks,  the  seventeenth-century  conquest  of  Ireland, 
colonial Kashmir, and Amazon rubber tappers:
“The red and green threads connecting these regions 
and  historical  moments  are  environmental  havoc, 
expropriation,  and  ordinary  peoples’  struggles  to 
protect common rights, resources, and social norms” 
(Epstein 2009: 701).
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In  doing  so,  “Linebaugh  extracts  tendencies  toward  enclosure 
and environmental destruction in the name of commercial profit, 
the  substitution  of  petroleum  products  as  the  world's  base 
economy, and the expropriation of indigenous people” (Aldous 
2008: 1) and presents this dark side of “capitalist democracy” as 
a fall from grace inherent in the political reality of the separation 
of the Magna Carta and the Charter of Forests. These two Great 
Charters  of  Liberties  (hereinafter  the  Great  Charters),  when 
understood and interpreted together had a direct  relation to “a 
world  of  use  values”  (Linebaugh  2008:  42-43)  in  that  the 
common rights, the rights of the commoners, were “laid upon the 
land” (Thompson 1993). That is to say that the customs of the 
people, the customary practices that they had in common and that 
they practised when  commoning were  articulated in  the  Great 
Charters, thus integrating the political organisation and activities 
of the commons and establishing a freedom for the commoners 
outside  of  the  state.  “Commoning” is  a  verb,  meaning  what 
commoners  customarily  do  “on  the  commons”  (Linebaugh 
2008). De Angelis in this regard writes:
“Commoning,  a  term  encountered  by  Peter 
Linebaugh in one of his frequent travels in the living 
history  of  commoners’  struggles,  is  about  the 
(re)production of commons. To turn a noun into a 
verb is  not  a little  step and requires some daring. 
Especially if in doing so we do not want to obscure 
the importance of the noun, but simply ground it on 
what is, after all, life flow: there are no commons 
without  incessant  activities  of  commoning,  of 
(re)producing  in  common.  But  it  is  through 
(re)production  in  common  that  communities  of 
producers decide for themselves the norms, values 
and measures of things” (De Angelis 2006).
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Moreover, commoning also means a community-based form of 
ecological  sustainability.  In  practice  and  political  reality,  the 
Great Charters established that “the people”, i.e. the commoners, 
had a right to farm the land and hunt animals for food, use the 
forests  for  fuel,  and  as  such  be,  largely,  self-sustaining  and 
independent  of  the  economy  of  the  nobles.  That  is  how 
Linebaugh  can  claim  that  the  Magna  Carta,  when  considered 
with its companion, the Charter of the Forests, “goes deep into 
human history” (see below), because the freedom and liberties 
involved  in  customary  practices  of  commoning  included  all 
aspects of human survival: food, fuel and building materials in an 
intimate relationship with the land to which they belonged. What 
concerned  commoners  were  not  abstract  rights,  but  practical 
approaches  to  life,  that  nevertheless  could  be  articulated  into 
property relations with regard to land and natural resources. A 
commoner would not ask “What is my individual right?
Commoners first think not of title deeds, but human 
deeds: how will this land be tilled? Does it require 
manuring?  What  grows  there?  They  begin  to 
explore. You might call it a natural attitude. Second, 
commoning  is  embedded  in  a  labor  process;  it 
inheres in a particular praxis of field, upland, forest, 
marsh,  coast.  Common rights  are  entered  into  by 
labor. Third, commoning is collective. Fourth, being 
independent of the state, commoning is independent 
also of the temporality of the law and state. Magna 
Carta  does not  list  rights,  it  grants  perpetuities.  It 
goes  deep  into  human  history"  (Linebaugh  2008: 
45).
This belonging of commoners to the land stands in sharp contrast 
to  the  post-enclosure  arrangements  where  land  belongs  
exclusively to individuals.  Nevertheless, they refer to the same 
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organisational questions concerning social relations with regard 
to things: access and use of resources. And for a long time they 
co-existed  as  we  shall  see.  The  transition  into  capitalism, 
however, spells the end of commoning6.
Understanding  Linebaugh's  argument  is  helpful  for  an 
understanding of the transition into capitalist democracy and thus 
sets the scene well for this essay. In a time where most of Europe 
was  in  the  thrall  of  war  and  conflict  the  Great  Charters 
articulated  peasants'  demand  for  the  right  to  their  custom  of 
control over their own existence; they delimited the brutishness 
of royal  authority:  “the sovereign power of  the king could be 
bound and held accountable” by means of the Great  Charters. 
However, Linebaugh makes explicit note of the ways in which 
the Magna Carta also protected the rights of the rising mercantile 
classes. Quoting from Chapter 41 of the Magna Carta, he writes 
that  “All  merchants  shall  be  able  to  go  out  of  and  return  to 
England  safely  and  securely  and  stay  and  travel  throughout 
England, as well by land as by water” to make it clear that the 
emerging capitalist market also took shape from the charter; and 
from Chapter 35 to note that in addition to providing freedom to 
exercise market relations the charter also defined the basic units 
(or parameters)  for commodities,  without  which the industrial, 
contractual  market  relations  and  the  commodity  could  not  be 
imagined:  “Let  there be one measure for wine throughout our 
kingdom, and one measure for ale, and one measure for corn, 
namely 'the London quarter'; and one width for cloths whether 
dyed, russet or halberget, namely two ells within the selvedges. 
6 Or, as we shall see, in Section 2.6, capitalism itself is based on a form of 
commoning  –  since  all  production  is  social  –  but  it  is  a  qualitatively  
different  form  of  commons  upon  which  it  rests;  indeed,  to  speak  of  a 
“capitalist commons” is somewhat oxymoronic.
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Let it be the same with heights and measures” (Linebaugh 2008: 
30).
There are therefore two different movements emerging from the 
Great  Charter  and  the  transition  into  capitalism  can  be 
understood as en ever narrower interpretation of the charters on a 
path  toward  the  establishment  of  exclusive  private  property  
rights –  privatisation  -  substituting  for  collective  rights  of  
commoning.  While  exclusive,  private  property  rights  are 
imposed, collective rights of commoning are emergent properties 
of the relations between commoners.
The American Declaration of Independence is in part a narrow 
interpretation of the Magna Carta that neglects “its pastoral and 
woodlands underpinnings” (Linebaugh 2008: 124), thus making 
it possible for American independence [to be] conducted in the 
name of  Magna Carta  [and to]  occur  in  the  midst  of  Atlantic 
expropriation of  commons lands" (Linebaugh 2008:  135).  The 
Magna  Carta  was  a  “document  of  reparations,  returning  the 
forest,  whereas  the  declaration  is  a  document  of  acquisition" 
(Linebaugh  2008:  124).  In  other  words,  the  era  between  the 
Magna  Carta  (1215)  and  the  American  Declaration  of 
Independence (1776), can be seen as an important period of the 
transition into capitalist democracy, where  the individual rights  
to property came to override the customary and collective rights  
to  land  and  subsistence that  in  great  part  had  provided  the 
inspiration for the democratic ideals of capitalism. The American 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  founding  fathers  made 
explicit reference to the Magna Carta, but  not to the Charter of 
Forests.  Over  time  the  Magna  Carta  became  a  document  of 
individual freedom and liberties, while the rights of commoning 
were conveniently forgotten.
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The  American  Declaration  of  Independence,  therefore,  is  a 
milestone  in  the  transition  into  capitalism,  on  Linebaugh's 
account.  That  is  because  the  American  Declaration  of 
Independence justifies the power of the state and articulates the  
right  of  an  individual to  private  property,  while  the  Great 
Charters  put  limitations  on  sovereign  powers  and  articulate 
collective rights of commoning. It is exactly this development - 
from an articulation of customary practices of commoning, i.e. 
collective rights to land access and use, to an abstract articulation 
of  the  individual  right  to  private  property  -  that  defines  the 
transition  into  capitalist  democracy.  It  also  defines  the 
subjugation of people – thus rendered legal persons, citizens with 
abstract rights – to the nation state. The commoners' collective 
autonomy was lost in this process.
In  this  essay  I  explore  how commons  can  be  recreated  with 
particular reference to property relations and social movements. 
By  doing  so,  I  begin  to  establish  a  framework  for  an  anti-
capitalist  conception of property. Such a conception, I hold, is 
indispensable for social organisation beyond the nation state. My 
discussion  starts  with  an  exposition  of  the  Free  Culture 
movement, which shares important political views with the Free 
Software movement.
48
